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Restructuring and rescaling water governance in mining 
contexts: the co-production of waterscapes in Peru  
Abstract 
The governance of water resources is prominent in both water policy agendas and 
academic scholarship.  Political ecologists have made important advances in 
reconceptualising the relationship between water and society.  Yet, while they have 
stressed both the scalar dimensions, and the politicised nature, of water governance, 
analyses of its scalar politics are relatively nascent.  In this paper, we consider how the 
increased demand for water resources by the growing mining industry in Peru 
reconfigures and rescales water governance.  In Peru, the mining industry‟s thirst for 
water draws in, and reshapes, social relations, technologies, institutions and discourses 
that operate over varying spatial and temporal scales.  We develop the concept of 
waterscape to examine these multiple ways in water is co-produced through mining, and 
become embedded in changing modes and structures of water governance, often beyond 
the watershed scale.  We argue that an examination of waterscapes avoids the 
limitations of thinking about water in purely material terms, structuring analysis of water 
issues according to traditional spatial scales and institutional hierarchies, and taking 
these scales and structures for granted.  
 
Keywords 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The governance of water resources, its principles, and the scale at which it is organised, 
is at the forefront of both water policy and scholarship within resource geography.  By 
exploring the power relations that underpin nature-society relations, political ecologists 
have advanced our understanding of water (e.g. Swyngedouw, 2004; Linton, 2010).  In 
doing so, they have delivered important insights into some of the perspectives, 
institutions and processes of water governance, such as water privatisation (e.g. Bakker, 
2003a, 2003b), integrated water resources management (e.g. Norman and Bakker, 
2009), hydraulic engineering (e.g. Swyngedouw, 1999), water technologies (e.g. Loftus, 
2006), hydrological studies (e.g. Budds, 2009), and social struggles (e.g. Perreault, 
2005).  Although this body of work has acknowledged the scalar dimensions of water 
governance, and has demonstrated that both water and its governance are politicised, 
linkages with the politics of scale - the recognition that scale is socially constructed and 
politically mobilised - are relatively nascent (see Cohen and Davidson, 2011; Norman and 
Bakker, 2009; Perreault, 2005; Swyngedouw, 1999, 2007).  Much work continues to take 
the hierarchical physical boundaries and administrative structures that characterise most 
instances of water governance as given, thus a closer examination of the scalar politics 
with which water governance is organised may yield valuable insights.  
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In this paper, we explore the plurality, reconfiguration and rescaling of water governance 
in the context of the increased demand for water resources by the growing mining 
industry in Peru.
1
  While existing research on the relationship between water and mining 
has centred on documenting how mining impacts water resources and users (e.g. 
Ochieng et al., 2010; Urteaga, 2011; Younger and Wolkersdorfer 2004), we turn our 
attention to the politics that mediate the use, management, regulation and framing of 
water in mining contexts. 
In Peru and other Andean countries, the exploitation of metal ores has rapidly increased 
since the 1990s (Bebbington, 2009; Bridge, 2004a).  This is due to several factors: the 
rising demand for, and price of, metals; Peru‟s liberalisation of its mining sector to 
(international) private companies for increased fiscal revenue; and technological 
advances that permit exploitation of more complex deposits.  The mining „boom‟ has 
resulted in the growth of concessions for mineral exploration and exploitation, which has 
increased demand for the natural resources - especially water - that are necessary for 
extraction (Bebbington and Williams, 2008).  As a result, the development of mineral 
extraction has transformed some parts of the Andean highlands from campesino 2 
agriculture to mining areas (Bebbington, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2008; Bury, 2005).  
Mineral extraction and processing require large flows of fresh water.  As mineral deposits 
are often located in places where supplies are scarce - due to arid climatic conditions, 
location in headwaters and/or full allocation of existing sources - the expansion of mining 
has greatly increased demand for, and competition over, water resources.  The principal 
implications of mining for water are depletion of sources and contamination.  Although 
the water used by mines in our case study region in southern Peru - Tacna and 
Moquegua Departments, where several large open-cast copper mines are in operation or 
under development – is „local‟ to the mine, many of the ways in which it is defined, used 
and governed happen over wider spatial and temporal scales.  In particular, both water 
extraction and contamination can occur in locations distant from mines that are not 
otherwise affected by mining.  While the material effects of mining for people and 
ecology are important, our interest is to examine the politics of water governance in 
relation to mineral extraction, in order to show how water and mining co-produce each 
other such that mining configures waterscapes in distinct ways.  
In order to approach the relationship between mining and water, we start from the idea 
that water is not merely a material substance that is subject to human manipulation, but 
a „hybrid nature‟ in which water‟s materiality and its social relations constitute and 
express each other (Linton, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2004).  Redefining water as co-
produced enables us to think about not only the social processes that shape water, but 
also the ways in which water also shapes social relations (e.g. Bakker, 2003a; Linton, 
2010; Loftus, 2009; Perreault, 2006; Swyngedouw, 1999).  Thus, our starting point is 
that the flows, forms, practices and discourses that characterise water in mining contexts 
will reflect the material and social processes through which instances of water become 
formed.  This requires attention to a range of moments, such as physical flows, patterns 
of access, technologies, institutions, practices, legislative reforms, governance 
frameworks, and discourses around water, which are mediated by social and political 
processes and collectively constitute the waterscape of a given context.   
Our aim in this paper is to consider the implications of the mining industry for water 
governance.  In doing so, we develop the concept of „waterscape‟, which we argue 
represents a useful framework to approach the multiple processes and dynamics that 
                                   
1
 The Political Ecology of Extractive Industries and Changing Waterscapes in the Andes, funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council, 2010–2012 (RES-061-25-0446).   
2 „Peasant‟ farmers, mostly from the Quechua and Aymara indigenous groups.  
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mediate water over space and time, in a way that avoids the limitations of thinking about 
water in purely material terms, analysing water issues according to traditional spatial 
scales, and accepting hierarchical forms of institutional administration as given. 
The paper is structured into four sections.  Following this introduction, in Section 2 we 
review debates over water governance and the politics of scale, and develop the concept 
of waterscape to capture the practices and narratives through which water is co-
produced as a result of mining, and embedded in flows, artefacts, institutions and 
discourses.  In Section 3, we analyse the relationship between mining and water 
governance in Peru, exploring the processes of restructuring and rescaling water 
governance arrangements in relation to the development of the mining industry and its 
need to secure water in the face of natural and produced scarcity.  In Section 4, we close 
by arguing that the concept of waterscape better captures the politicised and multi-scale 
ways through which mining and water shape each other.   
2. WATER GOVERNANCE, POLITICS AND SCALE: TOWARDS THE WATERSCAPE  
Governance and scale have always been central to political ecology and water resources.  
Political ecology is predicated upon both the plurality of multiple stakeholders in natural 
resource and environmental management, and the importance of historical and external 
socio-economic processes in shaping nature-society interactions in local settings (e.g. 
Blaikie, 1985; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Robbins, 2004).  Nevertheless, Brown and 
Purcell (2005) and Neumann (2009) have criticised much political ecology enquiry for 
both privileging the local scale, and neglecting the political construction and mobilisation 
of scale.  Similarly, the optimal organisation and scale of water governance has been 
vigorously debated within water resource studies and policy.  While some argue that 
greater inclusion of non-state actors in water management and governance should be 
accompanied by decentralisation to lower levels (e.g. Cohen and Davidson, 2011; 
Norman and Bakker, 2009), others contend that centralised coordination may be 
necessary for strategic reasons, because local management may only be effective for 
specific functions (e.g. Lebel et al., 2005).  
This section is divided into three parts.  In the first part we outline work on water 
governance in critical scholarship, and in the second we review the connections between 
the water governance literature and the politics of scale.  In the third part we develop the 
concept of waterscape.  
 
2.1 Politicising water governance  
The increased currency of the concept of water governance reflects the shift from 
„government‟ to „governance‟ in relation to public policy and environmental regulation 
(e.g. Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Himley, 2008).  The notion of governance reflects the 
changing nature of state power in economic, political and social life: it follows recognition 
of the transition from centralised authority to multiple instances of regulation and/or a 
reduced role in some aspects of public policy (especially under neoliberal frameworks), 
and the growing participation and influence of non-state actors in political arenas.  
Environmental governance thus concerns the organisational structures, institutional 
arrangements and decision-making processes and practices through which environments 
and resources are accessed, used, managed and regulated, which involves multiple 
formal and informal actors at different scales (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Himley, 2008).  
In a review of the multiple conceptualisations and applications of environmental 
governance, Bridge and Perreault (2009) stress the importance of considering the politics 
with which environmental governance becomes configured, both materially and 
discursively.  They propose a critical and dialectical approach to interrogate both how 
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social relations (among state, private and civil society actors) shape environmental 
governance, and how such modes of environmental governance (as the product of 
interactions between human agency and nature‟s materiality) produce new socio-natural 
arrangements.  Positioning environmental governance as inherently politicised invites 
critical engagement with the production, mobilisation and contestation of scale, by 
repositioning scale choices and processes of rescaling as the outcomes of socio-political 
processes, rather than as pragmatic and pre-given categories (Bridge and Perreault, 
2009; Himley, 2008).  For example, the creation of supranational agencies, processes of 
decentralisation and/or the formation of new instances of governance (such as corporate 
social responsibility initiatives or watershed committees) can be understood as the 
outcomes of efforts by private sector actors to redefine the geographical scope and 
participants of decision-making, in line with their particular interests (Himley, 2008).  
The emergence of governance in relation to water can be associated with three structural 
shifts in the water sector over the last two decades.  First, water management was 
usually organised on a sectoral basis, under which different aspects of water planning, 
use and management, fell under the remits of different government bodies, often with 
little or no coordination between them.  This structure came under increasing criticism 
during the 1980s, and was gradually replaced with the perspective that water was a 
holistic resource requiring integrated and cross-sectoral administration.   
Second, the management of water resources in accordance with political-administrative 
boundaries was deemed to be ineffective because water resources that were physically 
connected were subjected to different forms of use, management and regulation, again 
with minimal coordination across jurisdictions.  This gave rise to the consensus that the 
watershed
3
 is the most appropriate unit of water management and governance (e.g. 
Molle, 2009; Moss and Newig, 2010).  In turn, it was deemed preferable for local water 
management to be undertaken by committees of water users within a watershed, rather 
than by state agencies pertaining to political-administrative jurisdictions.  
Third, the water sector has been characterised by an increase in the participation of the 
private sector in the provision of water services and the management of water resources 
(e.g. Bakker, 2003a, 2003b; Budds, 2004; Budds and McGranahan, 2003).  Private 
sector participation has implied an organisational shift in the form and scale of water 
governance, through processes such as commercialisation, decentralisation and private 
water concessions and water rights.  It has also entailed a discursive transformation, as 
processes of privatisation are contingent upon water being redefined from a public good 
to a commodity (Bakker, 2003a; Kaika, 2003).  
These shifts have transformed the nature, scale and the social relations of water 
governance.  The reconfiguration of principles, structures and discourses, and the 
participation of non-state actors with different scalar dimensions, have important 
implications for the nature of state power in relation to processes of water governance 
(e.g. Norman and Bakker, 2009).  A focus on governance has increased attention to the 
non-state stakeholders who actually did (e.g. informal water vendors), or potentially 
could (e.g. non-governmental organisations), play a greater role in using, managing and 
regulating water, and the need to involve a wider range of actors both in water 
management and decision-making processes (e.g. Cohen and Davidson, 2011).   
Critical scholarship on water governance has taken up, and delivered critical insights into, 
the nature and dynamics of these shifts and their socio-ecological implications.  On the 
one hand, political ecologists have recast water governance structures and processes as 
having been configured through contestation and struggle, such that they reflect and 
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 Cohen and Davidson (2011: 1) define the term 'watershed' as a “hydrologically defined unit: an 
area of land draining into a common body of water such as a lake, river, or ocean”.  
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embody dominant interests and positions.  On the other hand, some scholars have 
moved towards a relational approach to water governance, by focusing on the state as a 
set of relations that produce people and places as opposed to a merely physical 
apparatus (e.g. Loftus, 2009), and on the relationship between water and people rather 
than the governance of the material resource (e.g. Swyngedouw, 1999).  In this respect, 
water governance (in its various forms and moments) has been understood and explored 
as a form of state re-regulation to secure capital accumulation, through both material 
and discursive means, which in turn produces particular forms of authority and social 
order (Bakker, 2003b; Budds, 2004; Harris, 2006; Loftus, 2006; Loftus and Lumsden, 
2008; Swyngedouw, 1999, 2005, 2007).    
 
2.2 Water governance and the politics of scale  
Despite recognition of the politicisation of water governance, and the importance of scale 
in the water sector, analyses incorporating the politics of scale into accounts of water 
governance are not as extensive as might be expected.  The politics of scale redefines 
conventional and spatial hierarchies – „international‟, „regional‟, „national‟ and „local‟ – 
from fixed „containers‟ of space that organise social processes, to categories produced by 
human efforts to interpret and order such processes (Brenner, 2001; Marston, 2000; 
Marston and Smith, 2001; Swyngedouw, 1997).  As Bridge and Perreault (2009) note, 
critical scholars have recognised the social construction of scale in environmental 
governance, yet have tended to take the adoption of „natural‟ scales for granted. 
Analyses of the scalar politics of natural resources and environmental issues have 
produced several important insights.  First, scales or boundaries have been repositioned 
as the products of processes of social definition, contestation and struggle (e.g. Brown 
and Purcell, 2005; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Fall, 2005; Swyngedouw, 1997, 2007).  
Second, resources and issues are framed, mobilised and organised according to particular 
scalar dimensions in order to justify certain perspectives, and/or reconfigure power and 
authority (e.g. Bolin et al., 2008; Cowell, 2003; Dore and Lebel 2010; Lebel et al., 2005; 
Mansfield and Haas, 2006).  Third, questioning existing categories of space has 
transcended the idea of „jumping scale‟ to describe the ability of social actors to operate 
in multiple arenas (Perreault, 2005).  Fourth, some analyses have shown that the 
characteristics of environments or resources also shape the scale of social relations, 
including forest (McCarthy, 2005), water and natural gas (Perreault, 2006) and urban 
environments (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003).  The politics of scale has prompted 
some scholars to redefine scale from vertical hierarchies to horizontal configurations, 
through flat ontologies (Marston et al., 2005), networks (e.g. Bulkeley, 2005) and 
borderlands (e.g. Fall, 2005).  
Existing work that has explored the scalar politics of water governance has focused on 
three main areas: the watershed as governance unit, the rescaling of governance under 
neoliberalism, and the production of scale through water.  We briefly discuss each of 
these in turn.  
The watershed is widely advocated as the appropriate unit of water governance on the 
basis that it represents the physical hydrological unit, yet, this „natural scale‟ is 
increasingly questioned (Cohen and Davidson, 2011; Griffin 1999; Norman and Bakker 
2009).  We develop five points:  
 First, the watershed scale is ambiguous, as it can be “as small as a sidewalk puddle 
or as large as the Great Lakes” (Cohen and Davidson, 2011: 2).  This is reflected in 
the nested hierarchy of sub-watersheds that characterise many basins.  
 Second, the extent to which hydrological units constitute „natural scales‟ is debatable 
(Cohen and Davidson, 2011).  Hydrological processes are extremely heterogeneous, 
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complex, dynamic and multi-scale, implying that they do not constitute a coherent 
scale in themselves (Jakeman et al., 1993).  Watershed boundaries are also defined 
(and redefined) by people, and are thus partly subjective (Blomquist and Schlager, 
2005; Cohen and Davidson, 2011).   
 Third, hydrological processes and units are conventionally conceptualised and 
measured as biophysical entities, obscuring that they are socially shaped in multiple 
ways (Budds, 2009; Linton, 2008, 2010).  River basins and water flows can be 
modified through hydraulic infrastructure, economic development and water policies, 
thereby rendering watershed boundaries infinitely porous (Bolin et al., 2008; Dore 
and Lebel, 2010; Turton et al., 2006).   
 Fourth, while hydrological units correspond poorly with political-administrative 
jurisdictions, conversely social organisation, electoral representation and 
environmental regulation do not coincide with hydrological units (Cohen and Davidson, 
2011; Dore and Lebel 2010).  While some authors reject that the appropriate scale 
for water governance can be simply derived from its physical boundaries (Cohen and 
Davidson, 2011; Lebel et al., 2005), others contend that water occupies multiple and 
overlapping socio-ecological scales (Bolin et al., 2008; Dore and Lebel 2010).  Cohen 
and Davidson (2011) highlight two particular shortcomings of the watershed as a 
governance unit.  The first is „problem-sheds‟, whereby watersheds frequently impact, 
and are impacted by, factors beyond their boundaries, which challenge watershed-
based governance.  The second is „policy-sheds‟, whereby policies formulated 
according to watershed and political-administrative units are unlikely to be reconciled. 
 Fifth, the framing and adoption of watersheds is political (Cohen and Davidson, 2011).  
Swyngedouw (1999) shows how the adoption of the river basin as the key 
governance unit in Spain at the turn of the 19th century rendered water governance 
technical, by privileging the knowledge and expertise of water engineers.  Similarly, 
Blomquist and Schlager (2005) argue that reconfiguring watershed-based governance 
to restrict decision-making to water users can also exclude the participation of 
political authorities and citizens in water affairs.  
Turning to the rescaling of water governance under neoliberalism, existing work has 
explored the material and discursive processes through which economic shifts reconfigure 
scale, and scale choices become politicised.  In their analysis of Canadian-US 
transboundary water bodies, Norman and Bakker (2009) found that decentralisation had 
not resulted in the delegation of decision-making power from higher to lower levels of 
government, and that, although processes of participation had increased, local groups 
had not become more empowered.  Similarly, examining the implications for resource 
management of the rescaling of the Bolivian state under processes of neoliberal 
restructuring, Perreault (2005) observed that, despite the creation of increased spaces 
for local participation, campesino irrigators formed national-level networks to contest the 
neoliberalisation of water through the discursive mobilisation of customary usage.  
Finally, Swyngedouw (2007) demonstrates that the production of nature is an integral 
part of the production of scale.  In his analysis of Spain‟s modernisation under General 
Franco, he demonstrates how national territorial integration (and political authority) was 
achieved through the construction of hydraulic infrastructure to connect river basins.  
Swyngedouw thus stresses how not only social relations, but also (hybrid) nature, co-
produce scale.  
Collectively, this work has made important inroads into the scalar politics of water 
governance, by examining the power relations embedded in scale choices, processes of 
rescaling and the production of scale through water.  This is important given that water is 
so deeply entrenched in hierarchical scalar arrangements: the hydrological cycle is 
conceptualised as operating at global, regional and basin scales, and water institutions 
are typically organised at the international, national, provincial and local levels (Moss and 
Newig, 2010).  However, these structures easily obscure the wider connections, other 
social dynamics, and natural agency that also shape water and its governance over space 
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and time.  In order to avoid defaulting into the materiality of water, conventional 
containers of space and structures of administration, we turn to the concept of 
waterscape.  
 
2.3 The concept of waterscape  
The term waterscape is increasingly emerging in work that links water and social power 
relations.  In this sense,
4
 the concept has been employed to explore the ways in which 
flows of water, power and capital converge to produce uneven socio-ecological 
arrangements over space and time, the particular characteristics of which reflect the 
power relations that shaped their production (Bakker, 2003b; Baviskar, 2007; Budds, 
2008; Ekers and Loftus, 2008; Loftus, 2006, 2007, 2009; Loftus and Lumsden, 2008; 
Swyngedouw, 1999, 2004).  As such, a waterscape is not merely the context within 
which water is contained, but “a produced socio-natural entity” (Loftus, 2007: 49) in 
which social power is embedded in, and shaped by, both water‟s material flows and its 
symbolic meanings, and which becomes embodied in, and manifested through, a wide 
array of physical objects and forms of representation (e.g. Loftus, 2009; Swyngedouw, 
1999).  For example, Swyngedouw‟s (1999) work on the Spanish waterscape shows how 
political power and national identity were produced and consolidated through a national 
programme of large dams that would foster development by transferring water from the 
humid north-west to the arid south-east.  Similarly, Baviskar (2007) notes how the 
construction of dams and the privatisation of water in South Asia have recast both social 
relations and institutional arrangements.  At a micro scale, Harris (2006) demonstrates 
how changing practices around irrigation in Turkey defined and altered gender 
subjectivities and dynamics. 
A defining feature of waterscapes, therefore, is the wide range of not just water flows, 
but also water-related artefacts, institutions and imaginaries, that embody and express 
power.  Here, Ekers and Loftus (2008) note the importance of not only examining large-
scale infrastructure and major projects, but also everyday practices related to water.  For 
example, in his analysis of the waterscape of Durban in South Africa, Loftus (2007) 
argued that the everyday practices of collecting water from standpipes, kiosks and 
ground tanks among low-income communities that were unserved by the municipal water 
supply network shaped the social relations of this particularly uneven waterscape, in 
particular by engendering protest and struggle over new technologies and institutional 
practices introduced as part of the commodification of water.  Loftus (2006) thus showed 
how water meters, alternative technologies and new pricing schemes were not merely 
practical measures to organise water provision, but instruments that embodied social 
power as they formed part of new strategies to foster capital accumulation from 
previously unserved informal settlements.  
By focusing on multiple dimensions of water-society interactions, waterscapes can be 
defined as extensively as appropriate, from neighbourhoods and cities (e.g. Loftus and 
Lumsden, 2008), to urban centres (Bakker 2003b) or river basins (Budds, 2008; Furlong, 
2006), and to regions (Harris, 2006) and countries (Swyngedouw 1999), and to 
emphasise historical trajectories (Loftus and Lumsden, 2008; Swyngedouw, 1999).  
However, it is important to stress that a waterscape is not simply an alternative spatial 
scale, but a socio-spatial configuration that is constituted by social and ecological 
processes, which become manifest through the particular nature of flows, artefacts, 
institutions and imaginaries that characterise a particular context.  Indeed, the 
representations and meanings that are embodied within instances of water also 
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 „Waterscape‟ is also used to mean paintings depicting a water scene, public water features, and 
an aquatic specialisation within landscape ecology (Orlove and Caton, 2010).   
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differentiate waterscapes from solely spatial analyses and less critical institutional 
analyses (see also Linton, 2010).  Such representations include the construction and 
enactment of particular „worldviews‟ around water that become manifested materially in 
institutional arrangements and technologies (Loftus and Lumsden, 2008), and the 
cultural and symbolic meanings embodied in water, which are prominent in sociological 
and anthropological studies (Baviskar, 2007; Orlove and Caton, 2010; Strang, 2004).  
We propose the concept of waterscape to analyse hydro-social relations in a given 
context, with a view to overcoming the confines of conventional spatial scales and 
administrative structures, and avoiding the pitfalls of „problem-sheds‟ and „policy-sheds‟ 
(Cohen and Davidson, 2011).  First, the concept emphasises the idea that water and 
waterscapes are co-produced, which avoids the limitation of thinking about water as a 
purely material resource that is the object of human actions.  Second, it incorporates the 
assumption that waterscapes are shaped by a range of socio-ecological processes 
occurring over multiple spatial and temporal scales, and which are not necessarily 
evident at the local scale or the present time.  Third, waterscapes comprise the 
assemblage of a wide range of water flows, technologies, issues, institutions, discourses 
and meanings that characterise waterscapes, and that produce, and are produced by, 
power relations.  In the next section, we use this approach to examine the 
reconfiguration of water use, institutions and discourses, and the rescaling of governance 
structures, in relation to mining in Peru.  
 
3. MINING AND THE CO-PRODUCTION OF WATERSCAPES IN PERU 
In this section, we draw on empirical research into the relationship between mining and 
water in Peru, including a case study in the south of the country, to consider what an 
examination of processes of mineral extraction might bring to an analysis of water 
governance.  We aim to show how the growth of mining and its need to secure water in 
the face of natural and produced scarcity has shaped multiple moments in the 
waterscape, including the restructuring and rescaling of water governance.  We start by 
presenting the evolution of water governance in Peru, and then consider how mining has 
reshaped waterscapes.  The last part analyses the politics of the changing nature and 
scale of water governance, and its implications for power relations.  
 
3.1 The evolution of water governance in Peru  
The legal and institutional framework for water governance in Peru has evolved over the 
last 40 years.  Until 2009, Peru‟s framework was sectoral and administratively 
hierarchical.  The former 1969 General Water Law (Ley General de Aguas) was passed 
alongside agrarian reform, implying that water allocation was strongly directed towards 
agriculture, Peru‟s principal water user.  Under this framework, water was managed by 
different ministries: the Ministry of Agriculture managed water allocation and use for 
irrigation, the Ministry of Housing administered drinking water and wastewater, the 
Ministry of Health oversaw water quality, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines regulated 
water contamination in relation to extractive industries.  At the local level, allocation of 
water rights
5
 and water resource management were organised by irrigation district 
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 Water rights are state-granted administrative concessions (licencias) that are required for all uses 
and sources.  They are allocated to land, and are not transferrable or tradable.  Water users are 
required to pay fees according to the flow consumed, type of use and source of water.  Although 
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(distrito de riego), a relatively small administrative area that corresponded minimally 
with watershed boundaries.  Water management within an irrigation district was the 
responsibility of a local „technical administrator‟ (administrador técnico).  Technical 
administrators were responsible for allocating and administering water across all uses 
within their jurisdiction, although irrigation was the dominant use.  Due to their relatively 
limited scope, capacity and resources, more complex issues, such groundwater allocation, 
were usually passed to the former National Institute of Natural Resources (Instituto 
Nacional de Recursos Naturales) in Lima (Technical Administrator, 2006).  
Alongside this formal state apparatus, a number of user-based water organisations 
managed and governed water locally.  These comprised water user associations (juntas 
de usuarios), defined by the General Water Law, irrigation committees (comités de 
regantes), and highland community water systems.  The latter comprise traditional 
systems that are managed by campesino village irrigation committees on a communal 
basis and according to customary rules and practices.  As such, these highland systems 
are multiple, diverse and dispersed (e.g. Boelens, 2008; Gelles, 2000).  All these water 
user organisations were predominantly agricultural, with little, if any, participation from 
other sectors.  They also had relatively little voice at the national level, despite the 
representation of water user associations by the National Board of Water User 
Associations (Junta Nacional de Usuarios de los Distritos de Riego).  However, the 1969 
framework included no formal role for the participation of these local water user 
organisations in water allocation, management or regulation.  
In 2009, a new Water Resources Law (Ley de Recursos Hídricos) was passed, building on 
a strategy that promoted integrated water resources management.  A revision to the 
existing law was needed for two key reasons.  First, the nature and structure of the 
Peruvian state had changed following processes of decentralisation from Lima to the sub-
national administrative units (regions, provinces and districts) in the late 1980s.  Second, 
the scale and nature of water use in Peru had significantly changed from the 1990s, 
following growth in water-related industries including export-oriented agriculture, urban 
development and drinking water coverage, extractive industries, and hydroelectric power 
production, which were promoted by successive governments and supported by a 
liberalised economic framework and governance structure.  The resulting increase in 
demand for water, the exploitation of new sources (especially groundwater), and the 
development of new infrastructure (especially hydraulic works) that these sectors 
required, presented new challenges for water governance that were not well 
accommodated within the existing framework (del Castillo, 2010).  
The new legal and institutional framework was proposed in 2004
6
 and developed by a 
National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua), comprising a „consultation 
commission‟ (comisión consultiva) made up of relevant government agencies and 
prominent independent institutes, and a „review committee‟ (comisión revisora) 
comprising the consultation commission plus key sectoral stakeholders, including the 
National Mining, Petroleum and Energy Association (Sociedad Nacional de Minería, 
Petróleo e Energía).  The draft framework was debated and amended in Congress from 
2006, and passed in 2009 (del Castillo, 2010).  Alongside the new law, a state water 
institution, the National Water Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Agua), was created in 
2008, which was intended to be cross-sectoral,7 autonomous,
8
 and decentralised.
9
  The 
                                                                                                             
traditional water entitlements are valid, and should be respected, many are not registered, 
especially in the highlands (del Castillo, 2006).  
6
 Although it drew on earlier proposals from 1997-1998 to introduce private water rights, support 
for this increasingly weakened as the draft law was negotiated (del Castillo, 2006).  
7 The Water Resources Law regulates all instances of water management and water-related issues.  
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National Water Authority has a regional presence through an Administrative Water 
Authority (Autoridad Administrativa del Agua) in 14 regions, and a Local Water Authority 
(Autoridad Local del Agua) in each major river basin.  The new framework thus 
integrated water under the National Water Authority and its sub-authorities, replaced the 
technical administrators with the Local Water Authorities, filled the gap in water 
governance that previously existed between the national level and the irrigation district, 
and changed the unit of water governance from the irrigation district to the river basin.  
Given the shift from a centralised approach to an integrated framework based on the 
watershed unit, the new law also mandated the establishment of river basin councils 
(consejos de cuenca), envisaged to incorporate all water user organisations and to be 
invested with significant decision-making powers.
10
  One key function of the councils is to 
integrate sources and water use sectors through coordination within the basin. 
 
3.2 Mining and changing waterscapes  
The connections between water and mining become embodied in, and expressed by, a 
range of „moments‟: water flows, rights, infrastructure, institutions and discourses.11  We 
present and analyse these in turn.  
Flows  
While we aim to move away from the unidirectional impacts of mining on water sources 
and users, the material effects of mining on water quantity and quality constitute 
important ways in which mineral extraction shapes waterscapes.  However, it is not only 
the material effects that are important, but the ways in which these effects arise, and 
potentially reconfigure mining activities.   
In Peru, water contamination through leaching (infiltration of acids and heavy metals 
used for ore separation) and dumping of tailings (finely ground rock from which ore has 
been extracted) from mines has been serious in some cases, especially in the past when 
environmental standards were less stringent, and has damaged the health of local 
ecosystems and people (Balvín, 1995; Urteaga, 2011).  Although in principle standards 
are now higher, some stakeholders suggest that contamination still occurs due to lack of 
state monitoring.  Moreover, it is not just physical contamination that is important, but 
the idea of contamination: water contamination continues to be strongly associated with 
any existing or potential mine, especially by groups opposed to mining.  The strong 
association of mining with water contamination has been an extremely pervasive 
negative image that the sector has been unable to discard.  
In Tacna and Moquegua, the extraction of water for mines is claimed to have depleted 
sources, with serious environmental and social consequences.  In some highland areas 
(from approximately 3500 metres above sea level), campesino people have alleged that 
high Andean alpine wetlands (bofedales) have significantly shrunk following the 
extraction of surface water and groundwater for mining.  The wetlands sustain 
                                                                                                             
8
 The National Water Authority was envisaged to fall under the remit of the newly-established 
Ministry of the Environment, but was provisionally housed within the Ministry of Agriculture.  
9
 The decentralised structure of the Water Authority institutions built on an earlier process of 
decentralisation of core state functions, such as infrastructure, from Lima to the regions from 2003. 
10
 Initially, the National Water Authority established six of these as pilot initiatives.  One of these 
comprises the Locumba-Sama and Caplina river basins in Tacna.  
11 From hereon in, we have anonymised some institutions and individuals to protect identities.  
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biodiversity, regulate the local climate, provide pasture for livestock (especially alpaca, 
the principal livelihood in the highest Andean villages), and feed water courses. 12  
Similarly, in the central parts of valleys (approximately 2000-3500 metres above sea 
level), some campesino communities have claimed that the flows of water into their 
customary irrigation systems have drastically reduced as a result of mining, restricting 
their ability to maintain (or expand) their traditional terraced agriculture.  
Through water, the effects of mining can be experienced in locations that are distant 
from the mine(s) and not otherwise affected by mining.  This has at least two important 
implications.  First, in principle, sources of water extraction may not be in the same 
jurisdictions as mines, which presents challenges for water governance (in terms of both 
regulation and user participation), whether organised on a political-administrative or a 
watershed basis.  Second, as the wider effects of mining on water quality and quantity 
are difficult to prove, such communities are seldom considered as „affected communities‟ 
(comunidades afectadas) and do not qualify for compensation.  For example, in 
Moquegua, the villages located in an area that supply water to some large mines (and 
claim that their wetlands have reduced as a result) have received very little revenue from 
the mining tax (canon minero), because they are not located in the administrative 
districts closest to the mine, to which the largest proportion of the revenue is paid.   
Furthermore, mineral extraction is the only major economic activity that takes place in 
the headwaters of basins.  However, the implications of disturbing headwaters – 
especially glacial headwaters such as those in some areas being mined in the Andean 
region – are extremely poorly understood (Bebbington and Williams, 2008).  The issue of 
the protection of headwaters was one of the most contested aspects during the 
formulation of the 2009 Water Resources Law.  While agricultural and environmental 
stakeholders strongly supported the prohibition of any development in headwaters, to 
avoid downstream impacts and to conserve ecosystems (and possibly also to attempt to 
curtail the expansion of mining), the mining sector vehemently resisted this restriction, 
arguing that there was no solid evidence that industrial activity in headwater areas would 
have adverse impacts if carried out responsibly (Urteaga, 2010).  The final version of the 
new law did not prohibit development in headwaters, which would have greatly affected 
the viability of many current and future mining ventures.  
Rights 
Many locations in which mineral extraction is possible - especially in southern Peru – are 
characterised by water scarcity due to arid conditions, location in headwaters and/or the 
presence of existing water users.  In contexts where little or no water is available, mining 
companies have sought to acquire water rights by various means.  First, one strategy has 
entailed acquiring land from campesino people (not always through ethical means) (e.g. 
Bury, 2005; Urteaga, 2011).
13
  For instance, in Moquegua, one mine is alleged to have 
bought an extensive area of pastureland containing wetlands from almost an entire 
campesino village.
14
  Although water rights can neither be bought nor transferred with 
land, it appears that, when land was sold, Technical Administrators simply used to 
                                   
12 While parts of these wetlands are dead, there is no data available to attribute this to water use 
for mining. 
13
 At widely diverging prices, with some sales at far below market value reported (Labor, 2006).   
14
 Reported by two Aymara campesina (female) landowners of a highland village near Moquegua 
(Campesina A, 2010; Campesina B, 2010).  Although water would have sustained pasture, it is 
unlikely that water rights would have existed.  It is unclear whether a mining company would be 
able to acquire water rights from wetlands; although, in this case, it is claimed that the land was 
required for a reservoir rather than for water extraction (Labor, 2011).  
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reallocate the same water rights to the new owner.
15
  Second, some mining companies 
have approached government agencies to discuss solutions.  For instance, in Tacna, 
mining company representatives liaised with the Technical Administrator, looking to 
facilitate the process of determining water availability by commissioning studies and/or 
by providing the logistics for field inspections (Technical Administrator, 2006; Mining 
Company 1-B, 2006).  Similarly, a company aiming to establish a new mine in the region 
approached the National Institute of Natural Resources in Lima to negotiate acquisition of 
the necessary water rights, offering to contribute to studies and infrastructure (National 
Institute of Natural Resources, 2006).  A third strategy has entailed the revision by 
mining parties of existing water allocation to identify any unassigned resources.  For 
example, a company in Moquegua observed that the infiltration of water from a reservoir 
floor into the aquifer had been overlooked, and requested the rights to this flow (Labor, 
2011).  The use of such strategies shows that water allocations and decisions can take 
place outside formal structures, and be influenced by social relations and vested interests.   
Infrastructure  
An important way of potentially fulfilling mines‟ demand for water is to „produce‟ water 
through hydraulic infrastructure.  Infrastructure that has been constructed or proposed in 
southern Peru includes large boreholes to extract groundwater, hydraulic works to enable 
inter-basin transfers, dams and reservoirs to produce water and energy, and desalination 
plants, whereby either desalinated water would be pumped to mines or supplied on the 
coast in return for the use of highland water at source (thereby saving the energy costs 
of pumping).  These supply-led technical solutions, proposed and constructed for mining, 
can significantly modify hydrological regimes and thus patterns and rules of access.  
Infrastructure solutions, however, are more complex than some of the above strategies, 
not only because they require government authorisation, but also because they are 
seldom cost-effective for the operational life of one mine.  In one case in Moquegua, 
where the new infrastructure was not economically viable for the mine alone, the 
company sought co-financing from the state, on the basis that the proposed dam and 
reservoir would also provide water and energy to other sectors (agriculture, urban 
centres), and would outlast the mining project (Mining Company 2, 2006).  In another 
instance, a mine sought to access water from a state irrigation project (State irrigation 
project, 2010a, 2010b), and subsequently offered a water swap, whereby it would draw 
water from the irrigation system in the highlands, and replace it with desalinated water 
on the coast.  This proposal was extremely contentious, due to the perception that the 
mining sector was diverting water from the agriculture sector, and also because state 
irrigation projects are fully financed by public investment due to their social functions 
(expanding the agricultural frontier and supplying drinking water).  In this way, mining 
also influences the type and organisation of infrastructure that is constructed.  
Institutions  
Through the National Mining, Energy and Petroleum Association, the mining sector 
actively participated in debates over, and the formulation of, the 2009 Water Resources 
Law in Congress (del Castillo, 2010; Oré, 2011).  The final version of the law reflected its 
influence, through the authorisation of economic activities in headwaters, and the 
prominence of the concepts of efficiency in water use and equity in access, which had 
been strongly emphasised by mining sector to signal that new entrants (i.e. mining) 
should have the same opportunities to access water as existing users (i.e. agriculture).  
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 Sosa (2010) reported that some campesino communities in Cajamarca (northern Peru) were 
persuaded by a mining company to relinquish their water rights on the basis that they no longer 
required them, so that the company could apply for them.  
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This illustrates how the influence of the mining sector became reflected in the very 
architecture of Peru‟s new water governance framework. 
One effect of the revised Water Resources Law was increased state control over water 
user organisations.  Whilst this intervention has established more formal links between 
state agencies and local water user associations, in particular on Peru‟s coast where 
water user organisations have more easily adapted to the legal framework (due to larger 
agricultural units and/or the nature of their organisational culture), it has presented 
challenges in relation to water management in other areas, especially the highlands.  
Given that the state has historically had very little, if any, presence in highland 
communities, campesino water systems were barely considered in the formulation of the 
new legal and administrative framework.  This means that the formal organisational 
arrangements for water user associations and river basin councils are not easily adapted 
to highland community water systems.  In principle, highland systems are expected to 
comply with the national legal framework, for instance by formalising unregistered water 
rights and incorporating village irrigation committees into water user associations.  
However, campesino communities‟ customary norms and rules for water allocation, and 
their own systems for governance, not only differ among themselves, but are also very 
distinct from those defined by, and operating under, the formal framework (see also 
Boelens et al., 2010; Gelles, 1998; Trawick, 2003).  Nevertheless, in practice, the small 
scale of highland irrigation systems, the isolation and lack of state presence in the 
highlands, and the wider cultural and economic marginalisation of Andean campesino 
people, has permitted communities to ignore, or at least delay, changes to their water 
governance structures and practices.  
At the time of writing, the participation of local stakeholders in the allocation of water 
rights by the Local Water Authorities, as prescribed by the new framework, had not 
happened, and decisions were being made by the regional Administrative Water 
Authorities and the National Water Authority in Lima.  However, in practice, civil society 
organisations and community groups have influenced some decisions through informal 
spaces for dialogue and advocacy, and also through contestation and protest.  For 
instance, immediately after the Water Resources Law was enacted, a respected 
independent research institute, the Peruvian Centre for Social Studies (Centro Peruano 
de Estudios Sociales), raised concerns about the potential effectiveness of the proposed 
channels for participatory decision-making in relation to water issues, and disseminated 
these through publications and radio broadcasts.  This led to some national, regional and 
local government agencies and users to participate in decisions, and some instances of 
contestation regarding water allocation to the mining sector.  
Discourses  
In Peru, the relationship between mining and water is not just material, but also 
discursive.  Some of the examples above have already shown how water has featured in 
debates about mining (e.g. inevitability of contamination, contestation over headwaters 
and state irrigation infrastructure).  Discourses that emerge about water in relation to 
mining affect how water becomes viewed and represented, and these framings can, in 
turn, have entirely material effects, especially when they disrupt mining activities.   
One way in which changing discourses are expressed is through the tension between the 
agriculture and the mining sectors over water.  In general, the agriculture sector, the 
longest-standing and the most voluminous water user in Peru, and with aspirations to 
further expand into export production, regards itself as threatened by increased 
competition over water from mining; while the mining sector considers that it is unable 
to acquire the necessary water rights due to existing allocation of water to irrigators, 
which have forced it to look to other ways of accessing water.  The mining sector thus 
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frequently contrasts its own estimated national use of water – two per cent
16
 – with that 
of the agriculture sector – approximately 80 per cent – to both trivialise its own water 
use (which can be significant at the local level), and frame the agricultural sector as an 
inherently inefficient water user.  The agriculture sector, in turn, emphasises the real and 
potential contamination of the mining sector, and represents itself as a more traditional, 
responsible and sustainable water user.  Similar discourses between communities and 
mining companies.  In Tacna and Moquegua, campesino representatives have used the 
alleged impacts of mining on their water resources to promote customary access to 
natural resources, to strongly oppose mining, and, arguably, to reinforce claims for 
assistance and/or compensation.  Some mining company representatives have responded 
to these narratives by framing peasant irrigation as inefficient both technically (i.e. water 
consumption) and economically (i.e. value of produce), and by suggesting alternative 
explanations for the alleged effects on wetlands and terraces, such as poor agricultural 
practices and climate change (e.g. Mining Company 1-A, 2006).   
Some of these discourses embed specific meanings of water, sometimes drawing on 
Andean indigenous meanings of water (e.g. Gelles, 2000).  For example, in Moquegua, 
groundwater extraction by a mine was specifically opposed by local campesinos, as they 
claimed that it would desiccate their pasture (Campesina A, 2006).  They remained 
unconvinced by a technical study that indicated that the water was not connected with 
their land; either because they did not trust the company, because they could not 
physically observe groundwater flows, and/or possibly because their preferred solution 
was a reservoir in which they hoped to be able to raise trout.  Nevertheless, local 
opposition was one factor in the company having to abandon plans to extract 
groundwater and seek alternative sources (Mining Company 2, 2006; Labor, 2006).   
 
3.3 Restructuring and rescaling water governance  
In Peru, the relationship between mining and water entails multiple artefacts, practices 
and discourses occurring in different places, at specific moments and with multiple 
connections.  Yet, many of the diverse „moments‟ outlined above coincide poorly with 
both the spatial scale and the administrative structure of formal water governance.  
Furthermore, the ways in which water flows and issues become shaped in relation to 
mining occur not in synergy, but in parallel, with other processes, such as administrative 
decentralisation, distribution of the mining tax, allocation of mineral concessions and 
livelihood strategies.  We would contend that this is because social processes occur 
within, across and beyond watersheds, in complex and dynamic ways.  This is illustrated 
by the pilot river basin council established in Tacna. 17   Although the council was 
established for the Locumba-Sama and the Caplina basins, the former of which extends 
into Moquegua, to date the council has become organised on an administrative, rather 
than a watershed, basis: the two basins cover much of the territory of Tacna, and 
stakeholders from the part of the Locumba-Sama basin located in Moquegua have as yet 
not been included.  This illustrates that, in practice, regional governance is not easily 
replaced, and watershed organisations are not always readily established. 
This raises two points.  First, due to the wide-ranging implications that mining has for 
water use and regulation, the watershed unit has little significance for governing water in 
relation to mineral extraction.  Inter-basin transfers and desalination, for instance, can 
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 This figure is highly debatable, since the only published data on sectoral water use are from the 
1980s, before the expansion of mining.  Furthermore, water use is mainly measured and reported 
by the mining industry, with little state monitoring.  
17 See note 10.  
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render the logic of the watershed as the unit of water governance futile, since they can 
modify its processes, resources and limits.  Although not the case in Tacna and 
Moquegua, in principle a mining venture could draw water from different watersheds, 
thus complicating governance structures and processes.  Indeed, in the Apurimac basin 
(central-southern Peru), one part of the watershed boundary was redefined for 
administrative purposes following the diversion of water to flow westwards towards the 
(arid) Pacific, rather than eastwards towards the (humid) Amazon basin (Vargas, 2010).   
Second, the principle of using the watershed as the basis of water governance suggests a 
unit that is both rational and coherent.  Yet, many watersheds in Peru are extremely 
large, heterogeneous and dynamic, both physically and culturally.  The watersheds that 
we examined in Tacna and Moquegua are highly diverse spaces with regard to 
contestation and conflict, as different (socio-economic and cultural) groups located in 
different parts of the basin struggle over water along different axes of material and 
symbolic differentiation: geographic areas (highlands / valley / coast), administrative 
regions (Tacna / Moquegua), user sectors (agriculture / mining), and socio-economic 
group (campesino / commercial).  
Moreover, the rescaling of water governance to the watershed level has the potential to 
significantly reconfigure power relations.  Whilst the strategy upon which the Water 
Resources Law was based suggests that the river basin was adopted as the unit of 
governance due to the prevailing consensus within integrated water resources 
management (as opposed to pressure from particular interest groups), we do note three 
implications of this shift in relation to the nexus between mining and water.  The first is 
that it serves to more effectively integrate the water resources of Peru‟s distinct „regions‟: 
the Pacific coast, the Andean highlands and the Amazonian lowlands.  This, in turn, could 
eventually facilitate the justification of transfers from the (humid) lowlands or highlands 
to the (arid) coast.  Such a view would coincide with the view held by some conservative 
Peruvian business and public sector groups that the poor and rural indigenous groups 
inhabiting the Andean highlands and Amazonian lowlands harbour valuable resources on 
their ancestral lands (e.g. minerals, oil) that they do not wish to be exploited, which is 
deemed to impede the generation of development and wealth for Peru as a nation.18   
A second is that the restructuring and rescaling of the institutional framework for water 
governance is advantageous for the mining sector in several ways.  First, it eliminated 
the previous agricultural bias, by formally recognising a greater plurality of water users, 
including the mining sector in water governance.  Second, it permitted development in 
the headwaters of river basins, which is essential for mineral extraction to proceed and 
expand.  Third, it established river basin councils as new institutions that will allow the 
mining sector – which almost never previously participated in water user associations - to 
become involved in local water governance.  Depending on how the river basin councils 
are organised (for example, if voting rights are proportional to water rights), mining 
companies could acquire significant power within these institutions, especially if the 
participation of other stakeholders is reduced.  
While the new Water Resources Law aims to promote coordination between resources 
and users, its legal and institutional framework only achieves this through the river basin 
councils.  This is partly because the National Water Authority and its sub-authorities do 
not incorporate participation from non-state actors; the only entity that does this is the 
river basin council.  It is also partly due to the new water framework being decentralised 
to the regions and the basins, yet disconnected from the regional governments and wider 
political-economic processes (such as economic development, investment of the mining 
tax and land-use planning) that also affect the mining sector.  Importantly, there is as 
                                   
18 This attitude was expressed by former President García (1985-1990; 2006-2011) as the „dog in 
the manger syndrome‟ (síndrome del perro del hortelano) (García, 2007). 
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yet little evidence that these efforts at integration have reduced tensions between 
different uses and users, not least because they do not address the coordination of 
upstream-downstream water uses and impacts.   
Lastly, at the time of writing, this rescaling existed in theory rather than in practice.  In 
principle, the decentralised water framework would delegate more power from the 
National Water Authority to the regional Administrative Water Authorities and the basin-
level Local Water Authorities, to both fill the former gap between the national level and 
the irrigation district, and strengthen the Local Water Authorities.  Yet, to date, power 
and decision-making appear to be largely concentrated in the National Water Authority.   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we set out to examine the relationship between the growing mining 
industry and increased demand for, and competition over, water resources in Peru.  In 
particular, we sought to demonstrate the application of the concept of waterscape, by 
analysing how the influence of the mining sector becomes shaped by, and embedded in, 
a panorama of water flows, artefacts, institutions and discourses.  We suggest that this 
perspective avoids three particular limitations in relation to analysing water governance. 
First, understanding the waterscape as a socio-natural entity, in which water and power 
are co-produced and expressed, enables a shift from thinking about the governance of 
water as a material resource towards an examination of the relationship between water 
and society.  Our study of southern Peru shows how water and mining shape each other, 
both materially and discursively.  Natural and produced scarcity, social relations of water 
use and people‟s attitudes towards water all challenge the mining sector‟s access to 
water, and, in turn, the mining industry‟s need to fulfil its thirst for water has influenced 
governance arrangements in particular ways, for example, through the mobilisation of a 
variety of strategies to acquire water for new mines, proposed co-financing arrangements 
for hydraulic infrastructure, and the framing of agricultural users as inherently inefficient.  
In this way, examining the waterscape reveals the reach of the mining sector in Peru. 
Second, by looking beyond the formal institutions that govern water, to the multiple 
social relations through which water governance is enacted over space and time, a 
waterscape analysis also endeavours to transcend conventional and hierarchical 
administrative structures that characterise formal water governance.  In Peru, an 
important consequence of the growth of mining has been the transfer of water 
traditionally used by campesino communities to mines, which both changes traditional 
livelihoods and landscapes, and enables the mining industry to expand and develop.  An 
analysis of the formal governance structure alone would fail to fully capture the ways in 
which mining company representatives may negotiate water solutions directly with 
communities or government agencies, the mining sector‟s influence on the legal and 
administrative framework formulated to govern water, the ways in which successive 
governments have supported the development of the mining sector, or the framings used 
to justify the diversion of water to the mining sector.  This illustrates how scales are 
framed and mobilised, and how different strategies are employed to occupy different 
levels.  Furthermore, rather than explaining these relations in terms of „jumping scale‟, 
we would suggest that the actors who are more effective in influencing water are better 
able to capture and occupy these different moments in the waterscape.  For instance, 
mining companies operate at diverse levels: their lawyers negotiate water rights or 
contest government decisions; their community relations teams liaise with villages; and 
their technical staff produce studies to support proposals or refute claims.  By doing so 
they are present in, and influence, multiple spaces and moments in different ways.  
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Third, thinking in terms of waterscapes avoids confining analyses to conventional scalar 
containers, and taking scale choices for granted.  Analysing the production of 
waterscapes, rather than the spatial governance of water, captures the multi-scalar 
processes through which water is co-produced and embodied in a wide panorama of 
water flows, social relations, technologies, institutions, practices and discourses.  On the 
one hand, this has allowed us to move beyond the material impacts of mining on water, 
or the water footprint of mining (e.g. Allan, 2011), by examining how, through mining, 
this panorama becomes configured.  On the other hand, it has illustrated how the 
restructuring and rescaling of water governance reconfigures power, especially through 
the creation of the river basin councils.  In this way, analysing the waterscape is inspired 
by the multiple forms, connections and meanings of water, rather than guided by a 
predetermined container of space. 
Here, we add our voice to existing critiques of the use of the watershed as the basis of 
water governance, by asserting that it is particularly problematic in relation to the 
specific issues and challenges posed by the expansion of extractive industries.  Due to 
the extent of mines‟ area of influence, their high demand for water, as well as the 
particular socio-ecological conditions that characterise many mining areas (such as 
glacial headwaters and indigenous territories in the Andes), the rationale of the 
watershed becomes, at best, greatly reduced, and, at worst, redundant.  We suggest 
three reasons.  First, some of the key strategies through which the mining sector 
captures, or „produces‟, water, such as inter-basin transfers, groundwater extraction and 
desalination, render the watershed limits infinitely porous.  Second, so many of the social 
and decision-making processes in relation to water and mineral extraction, such as 
economic development and land use planning, occur beyond the watershed.  The 
watershed thus plays little role in organising other aspects of social and economic life 
that intersect with water and mining.  Third, while the watershed unit may - albeit 
arguably - integrate water resources, it may also disconnect them from other instances 
of governance, and does not always address the important challenge of regulating 
upstream and downstream users and impacts.  
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